Amidst the sadness and the tears, amidst the shock and the horror, amidst the rubble and the ruin,
may perfectly well be so. The term 'militant Islam' fails to describe an end, however, and thus gives us no clue of the ultimate objectives other than violence. For this reason, it must be discarded as inadequate for our purposes. Similarly, radical Islam is a term that tells us a great deal about the extremists' relationship to other Muslims, however, it tells us very little about the ways in which they are radical (even amongst extremist Muslims there is a great deal of diversity in their goals). Political Islam on the other hand informs of us a great deal. Indeed, contained within it are the senses of those two previously suggested labels, a radical militancy, plus the added benefit of a clear indication of those group's objectives. Thus, considering the stated goals of bin Laden, the most accurate labeling of the movement he represents is that of political Islam.
This raises a separate problem of what language we should use to describe this movement. To the eyes of almost all Americans, bin Laden is a terrorist sine qua non. The indiscriminate way in which he struck out against the United States on September 11 th is, and always will be, an unforgivable act. But in acknowledging that his is ultimately a political movement, the reunification of Islam with political governance, it opens up the debate to the possibility that while bin Laden is a terrorist to the West, in other eyes he is a freedom fighter. That is no doubt how he sees himself. Yet, to discuss him as a political figure would grant him the legitimacy he has yet to earn, even in the Muslim world, and would betray the fact that by Western (and increasingly Muslim) lights, his methods are those of a terrorist.
The story of how Osama bin Laden became the world's most wanted man is also the story of how the U.S. created its own mortal enemy. In bin Laden's radicalization, the seeds of Al-Qaeda, the standardbearer of modern political Islam, were sown.
Saudi Arabia is the home of Wahabbism, one of the most draconian forms of Islam in existence today.
Its doctrines emphasize strict adherence to all the lessons contained within the Koran, the holy book of Islam, and the Sunnah, the example of the Prophet and founder of Islam, Muhammad (Esposito 2002, 6) . Wahabbism pervades civil society in Saudi Arabia and its teachings were likely crucial in bin Laden's early development. In contrast to most of the siblings in his wealthy family (his father founded the largest construction firm in the Middle East), bin Laden did not head west for his university education. At King Abdulaziz University, he encountered Abdullah Azzam, a Jordanian follower of the Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb who advocated "militant global jihad ideology and culture." 1 Azzam would play the role of mentor to bin Laden, both at university and more especially in Afghanistan, following the Soviet invasion in 1979. And indeed, only by heading East did bin Laden find what he came to see as his true calling, for up until that point there is no evidence that he had sided with the increasingly radical tone of the Islamic opponents of the Saudi ruling regime (Esposito 2002, 9 ).
Afghanistan was a fractured country, divided ethnically between Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras and religiously with a Sunni majority and Shiite minority (Esposito 2002, 10) . The Soviet invasion, however, united them against a common enemy in the religiously sanctioned practice of defensive jihad. Bin Laden, along with thousands of Muslims worldwide, including Azzam, answered the call.
Though bin Laden did not prove himself in combat initially, he endeared himself to Azzam by using his family's wealth and connections to act as a veritable quartermaster-cum-recruiter. The most valuable lesson bin Laden learned while in conflict, however, was the power of an efficient organization with a global network of contacts. Bin Laden used such a network to attract millions of dollars of support, as well as fresh recruits to the jihad. It was using this network that he and Dr. Azzam founded the "Bureau of Services," an early version of what would later become Al-Qaeda. 2 Because of the way the conflict had been framed as a jihad in service of greater Islam, it was not surprising that combatants viewed the conflict as a struggle between the faithful, the mujahideen, and the refers to the revolutionary struggle…to achieve this objective" (Benjamin and Simon 2003, 60 ). The mujahideen that had come of age in Afghanistan had had their religious fervor aroused. They would later become the revolutionary cadre for bin Laden's revolutionary agenda. The organization he would use to implement it was the former "Bureau of Services," now renamed Al-Qaeda.
That revolutionary agenda found a ready application as the mujahideen began heading home. They clamored to put their notion of political Islam into practice, and immediately came into conflict with the ruling regimes, from whom they felt alienated after their years in Afghanistan (Benjamin and Simon 2003, 105). Their religious fervor would soon find an outlet.
It was one of the great coincidences of history that in the same year that the Spanish conquistadores finished their Reconquista, their martial skills were immediately applicable to the colonization and proselytization of the New World, thereby maintaining and redirecting the religious fervor of these soldiers while avoiding the problems that a large, martially inclined, newly inactive male population can create for societies. That such a situation could in many ways repeat itself 500 years later is truly In theory, however, anyone can issue a fatwa because it does not become binding until it has been ratified. In the modern era, Bin Laden has used this loophole to great effect, exploiting the fact that the ulema had lost credibility and been labeled hypocrites as a result of their close association with the Saudi regime. In particular, he has issued fatwas on behalf of Al-Qaeda that radically redefine In 1996, bin Laden issued his first public fatwa, "Declaration of War" demanding the removal of all American forces from Saudi Arabia, or as he calls it, the "Land of the Two Holy Places." Though it specifically is in reference to the presence of American soldiers on Saudi soil, in its long rambling entirety bin Laden lays out a host of reasons that justifies his declaration of war. Thus the fatwa is doubly valuable, informing us not only of his specific objections, but allowing us to peek into his thought processes and construct a profile of his world view.
In terms of the content, he makes a number of interesting statements after first removing all doubt as to the cause of this fatwa: "The latest and the greatest of these aggressions…is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places…by the armies of the American Crusaders and their allies." 3 If it is not possible to push back the enemy except by the collective movement of the Muslim people, then there is a duty on the Muslims to ignore the minor differences among themselves.…Under such circumstances, to push the enemy-the greatest kufr-out of the country is a prime duty. No other duty after Belief is more important. 7 At this point, the fatwa changes in tone. While not completely changing its audience it moves from laying out the case for jihad against the United States into lessons and advice for Muslims who wish to aid in the fight. To this end, bin Laden does such things as chastise Muslims against engaging in internecine warfare as it would weaken the cause, recommend a strategy of guerrilla warfare, exhort jihadis to focus exclusively on the Americans, and perhaps most surprisingly suggest an economic boycott of all American goods. 8 The final portion of the fatwa represents another shift in subject matter, this one devoted to insulting and humiliating President Clinton and Defense Secretary William Perry while simultaneously lauding the virtuous qualities of the jihadis. This portion of the fatwa contains two of the most significant elements of bin Laden's message. The first explains the certainty of bin Laden in political Islam's ultimate victory, the still famous phrase, "These youths love death as you love life." 9 Islam can never lose, because her warriors can and will fight to the bitter end. The second is his assertion that fighting the Americans is one's duty, not one's choice. 10 Bin Laden is echoing his earlier calls that all minor squabbles must be put aside in the service of this cause. Ironically, bin Laden's language here is channeling no one so much as Pope Urban II in his address at Clermont, calling upon all true Christians to go and defend the faith. 11 The language of bin Laden reveals quite clearly his conceptions of the natural order of things. The first thing we notice is the overt religious language in a legal opinion, reminding us of the confluence and inseparability of religion and politics in his world view. Second, we notice the term "Zionist- 16 Finally, in his last public pronouncement before September 11, 2001 , he declared that Al-Qaeda was seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction and viewed their acquisition and use as a religious duty, far outstripping whatever forms of resistance had been shown earlier. 17 Extracting from these statements a brief summary of the grievances of bin Laden as well as his goals should prove quite instructive. First, his most significant complaint is entrance of Western (read Christian) soldiers into Saudi Arabia, implying that the Saudis could not defend themselves. Second, he rails against the use of Saudi Arabian bases in combination with international sanctions that have caused the death of, he claims, over one million Iraqis. Third, he bemoans the continued violence against Muslims across the borderlands of the Islamic world, be it the Philippines, Kosovo, Thailand, Chechnya, Somalia, or many others. Fourth, he objects to the close cooperation of the United States with Israel. Fifth, he views the United States and the West as responsible for the immiseration of the Arab world and in particular objects to the selling of oil, the people's wealth, to Western countries.
With the exception of his exploration of American economic injustices, he consistently emphasizes the religious dimension of even political acts, focusing on how they have wronged Muslims as a nation, not the members of any one state.
His goals are straightforwardly outlined in his fatwas of 1996 and 1998. He wishes to drive the Americans, and non-Muslims generally, from Saudi Arabia first and then the rest of the Islamic world. Next, he wants to replace the Saudi government with one that has not abandoned sharia, or in other words, a pure Islamic government. Finally, he wants to recreate the nation of Islam, the umma as it existed 18 Contained in this short passage is the full explanation in bin Laden's view of why "what happened to America was something natural, an expected event" as well as his statement of the problems that need to be fixed. 19 The terrorist attacks in bin Laden's mind were divinely sanctioned retribution for the litany of abuses and humiliations inflicted upon Muslims over the last eighty years. What most Westerners could not really comprehend was that September 11 th to bin Laden was the point at which the twain met. In giving the go-ahead to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's plan, bin Laden believed he could exact revenge while at the same time achieve his first strategic objective: the withdrawal of all U.S. forces in the Muslim world. Thus, violence was itself the point.
There is a simple calculus at work in bin Laden's mind regarding the use of violence to achieve his ends against the United States. He believes that the United States is weak and will run if bloodied, or even fail to stand up for itself in the first place. In many ways his belief is borne out by history. In possessing any of the cultural, economic, or social prerequisites that led to its adoption in the West. 22 As for the other vocalized grievances of bin Laden, the sanctions against Iraq were enacted to prevent (Lewis 2003, 53) . Moreover, in such a case it would probably be very easy to co-opt or buy them off. What is far more certain is that they deeply believe in the cause-and-effect narrative they have established, whatever its actual validity, and will thus continue to act according to its logical prescriptions in order to ensure their desired result, a new Caliphate. American policy ambitions yet, namely that 41% of Pakistanis now disapprove of bin Laden. These concurrent changes do not necessarily indicate a causal relationship, but it is undeniable that America's stock is rising in Pakistan. Even better news is that after similar efforts by the United States in Indonesia following the tsunami, our approval rating was as high as 65%. 23 This is evidence of one highly effective way of courting public opinion. There are doubtless many other similar avenues available, all one need do is look. And that ought to begin with a wholesale re-evaluation of America's foreign aid program. Less than $1 billion given over the course of the last year to disaster victims has likely done the United States more good in the eyes of Muslims than $2 billion given to Egypt for each of the last twenty years. Actions such as these do much to endear Americans to crucial Muslim demographics, the same demographics that Al-Qaeda must rely on to fill its ranks. America need not defeat the political Islamists outright, merely just prevent them from winning.
Woodrow Wilson is often credited with the dictum "Never murder a man who's committing suicide."
The United States Department of State and executive branch would be wise to consider this advice as what to read, what to watch, and how to behave, and they are frustrated at the glacial pace of change." 24 Thus, as a long-term force, political Islam appears unsustainable amongst its own practitioners. Moreover, for all the faults of the Iraq invasion, it is undeniable that it has allowed Al-Qaeda to demonstrate to murderous effect that its sole prescription is violence, and each time that violence is directed at Iraqis rather than Americans, its claim to represent the worldwide umma, to be the spokesperson for the Muslim nation, is undercut more and more.
Political Islam is a force that thrives on opposition. Most Americans ought to have seen enough cable television news, however, to know that you do not need to defeat political parties. You only need to marginalize them. How well the United States ultimately fares in the War on Terror will be a reflection of how deeply it has internalized that lesson.
Notes

